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On June 28, 1995, just twelve hours before the threat of punitive sanctions on
Japanese automobiles was to become effective, an impending trade war between
the US and Japan was averted. The threat of punitive tariffs seemed to play
a central role in the US bargaining strategy and was specifically mentioned by
President Clinton in explaining how an eventual compromise was reached.1 The
nature of the US threats is somewhat paradoxical in that they did not directly
tiect the market over which the dispute was centered. The US intended to place
prohibitively high twiffs on Japanese luxury automobiles if Japan did not agree
to market share targets in its auto parts industry.2 Thus, the US did not threaten
any action directly against the market over which the trade dispute was centered;
rather, they threatened a related market which would indirectly impact the auto
parts industry in Japan.
An obvious question, then, is whether the threat of punitive tariffs on Japanese
1Specifically, Clinton said, “After 20 months of negotiations, I ordered my trade representa-
tive, Ambassador Kantor, to impose sanctions on Japan unless it agreed to open these markets.
Today Japan h= agreed that it will truly open its auto and auto parts markets to American
companies. ” [8]
ZLevinsohn [14] suggests that this policy would extensively reduce the profits of Japanese
producers, concluding that the threat of these tariffs led to the negotiated agreement in auto
parts. In contrast, we argue that the threat itself could be sufficient to generate volunta~
compliance with market share targets in auto parts,
2auto manufacturers (who purchase auto parts in Japan) is sufficient to
the market share target. More broadly, if the US wishes to achieve
implement
the target
(in auto parts) without any help (or hindrance) from the Japanese government,
what policy or set of policies should it adopt. This paper addresses these two
questions by developing a model which highlights the linkages between markets
and finds, somewhat surprisingly, that the credible threat of punitive tariffs on
automobile producers, who purchase goods in the auto parts market, is sticient
to implement the market share policy. In contrast to other mechanisms which
require that governments carefully choose their policies to exactly attain a desired
outcome, this policy requires relatively little information on the part of the US
government. That is, the government need only make a sticiently large threat
to attain the desired
practice are obvious.
outcome. The advantages of utilizing such a mechanism in
The role of threats in trade policy is not limited to the recent US-Japanese
trade dispute. The US has routinely publicly threatened to revoke China’s most
favored nation status if it failed to curb intellectual property rights abuses in
its markets. The US has also threatened Rance with a wide range of punitive
sanctions if it failed to open its agricultural markets to US goods. The common
factor in all of these cases seems to be that the US has been trying to effect some
3type of VIE policy in China, Japan, and France by means of threats in linked
markets. Notice that the US has always made its threats very public, perhaps
as a commitment device, so that they would be credible to the fiected nations;
however, in all of these cases, the need to actually impose punitive sanctions was
averted and the parties came to some agTeement.
In the parlance of international trade, the market share or quantity targets3
discussed above represent a results-otiented trade policy; that is, a policy whose
measure is in terms of market outcomes rather than in the power of the tools
used in the implementation. For example, a conventional trade policy might call
for an x% tariff on some good, which might be anticipated to result in an a%
market share for some country in the market for the good. A results-oriented trade
policy would specify the market share target only, and leave the implementation
to the discretion of the countries entering into the agreement. The details of the
implementation, however, can significantly impact the distribution of gains and
losses among those affected. The advantages of the use of threats to linked markets
are threefold. First, such threats result in self-enforcing agreements; that is, even
without the ability to directly intervene in the market being targeted, effective
3The particular market share policy has been dubbed a voluntary import expansion, or VIE
by Bhagwati [1].
4control may still be exercised. Second, while many market share restrictions tend
to act as facilitsting practices, our scheme may mtually encourage competition.
Finally, this scheme does not allow the implementation procedure to be chosen in
a way which facilitate Japanese interests at the expense of US firns.
Strategic manipulation by the government whose markets are directly affected
by the results-oriented policy has been formally modeled in several applications.
Krishna, Roy and Thursby [13] consider the case where the affected market
is imperfectly competitive. Analogous to the results of Gruenspecht [11] and
Carmichael [3], Krishna, Roy and Thursby find that the effects of such policies
depend crucially upon the timing of the government policy rtie. Greaney [9]
also considers an imperfectly competitive market where firms compete variously
in price or quantity. She finds the optimal policies depend crucially upon the
specification of the firms’ strategy space; however, under both specifications, the
implementation of a VIE results in reduced competition among the firms.
In contrast to these papers, which mainly examine how imposition of market
share targets might be achieved through tariffs, subsidies and the like which affect
the targeted market directly, our scheme considers imposition via threats in a
linked market. As an illustration, consider the link between the market for auto
parts and that for automobiles themselves. We examine the effect of threats to
5impose tariffs in the automobile market on the behavior of firms in the auto parts
market (who sell to the auto market). We show that the threat of tariffs in the
auto market is sufficient to induce the competitors in the auto parts market to
adhere to the market shine requirement. Two elements are crucial to this result:
First, the markets must be linked so that threats in the auto market indirectly
affect the auto parts market. Second, the threats must be sticiently unpleasant
and credible4 that the competitors in the parts market prefer to abide by the
target rather than compete in the usual fashion and suffer the tmiffs. The threat
must be potentially damaging to the fires which would ultimately benefit from
the mwket share target; for example, the US auto parts firms in the dispute with
Japan. If the execution of the threatened action actually benefits these firms,
then they have incentives to behave strategically and ensure that the share target
is not met, Ironically, it is the US firms which act to undermine the market share
target when they are the beneficiaries of US government threats.
We consider the following model: Suppose that there are two firms, one from
the US, the other from Japan, competing Cournot style in the Japanese auto parts
4While credibility in the sense of subgame perfection is not formally modeled in this analysis,
in the auto parts example, there would be little reason not to implement the threatened tariffs.
Levinsohn [14] shows that US firms would not be affected by its imposition, and it is doubtful
whether the political “losses” from disaffected Lexus owners would have any impact on Clinton’s
reelection prospects.
6market where the market share target is to be implemented. The demand for these
auto parts comes from Japanese auto manufacturers who sell in both Japan and
the US. Thus, the US government can threaten to impose tariffs on Japanese auto
makers if the mwket share tmget is not met. Naturally, the imposition of this
tariff reduces the derived demand in the auto parts market thus creating a linkage
between the two markets. We find conditions such that the threat of such a tariff
leads to the implementation of the VIE as a Nash equilibrium of the game. We
contrast the results obtained via credible threats with those achievable through
direct intervention via production subsidies m well as with results achievable
through a combination of threats and direct intervention. Finally, we examine
how the minimal tariff required to implement an a% mmket share target varies
with the number of competing firms. In an appendix, we show that the main
results are unchanged when firms compete in prices instead of quantities.
The paper consists primarily of a graphical analysis of firm best response
functions and equilibria induced by the use of credible threats on the part of
the government. Due to the discontinuities in firm payoff functions, graphical
analysis becomes advantageous in two respects: First, it makes transparent the
forces impacting on the optimization decisions of the firm, and second, it makes
the characterization of equilibria considerably easier than a purely mathematical
7treatment. Throughout, the figures used in the paper will reflect a simple linear
case; however, the qualitative characteristics of the figures are robust to more
general demand specifications.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the basic model. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium outcome under Cournot competition. Section 4
examines how the results are affected by one-sided threats which only adversely
tiect some of the firms, and weak threats, which do not impose large penalties
when fires do not adhere to the market share target. Section 5 compares the
results of Sections 3 and 4 to direct intervention (rather than threats) on the
part of both governments. Section 6 examines how the set of equilibria changes
with the number and composition of competing firms. Finally, Section 7 draws
conclusions. Appendix A shows that the main results of the paper are largely
unchanged when firms compete in prices rather than quantities. Appendix B
outlines the details of calculations for the many fim case.
2. Preliminaries
Consider the interaction between two countries, H and F, and two markets, auto
parts, which we denote u for the upstream market, and autos, denoted d for the
downstream market. Suppose that the market for autos only exists in H and that
8an F company is a monopolist in this good. 5 The parts market only exists in
F with single fires from each country competing Cournot style in this market.
The only demand for the u good comes from autos, which require one unit of u to
produce one unit of d.GThe parts firms are assumed to be identica17with constant
marginal cost, c, to produce the u good. The auto producer is assumed to be able
to costlessly convert a unit of u into a unit of d, and thus h~ a constant marginal
cost equal to the price prevailing in the parts market.
The governments of the two countries agree to
consisting of a market share target for the u good.
market share target. The H government can make
of a tariff on the d market if the target is not met.
no policies whatsoever.
a results-oriented trade policy
Let a denote the agreed upon
threats such as the imposition
The F government engages in
The extensive form of the game is as follows: Initially, the H government
publicly announces the policies which it will implement. Trade in the u market
then takes places and the agreed to market share target is either met or not. If
5Alternatively, imagine that H and F firms compete Cournot syle in the market for d, then
the F firm will act as a monopolist on the residual demand curve for the good d taking as given
the actions of the other players. Such an alternative specification would not qualitatively affect
the results of the model,
‘It is immediate that any constant input requirement production technology for transforming
the u good into d will work. A one-t~one transformation is assumed for analytical convenience.
7The ~sumPtion of identical upstream firms is merely for analytical convenience and is not
crucial to the results.
9the target is not met, pre-specified sanctions are imposed by the H government
on the market for d. Following this, trade takes place in the d market, and payoffs
for all players are determined.g
The fires in the u market face a derived demand curve based on the needs of
the d firm in supplying the downstream market.9 Define uH to be the quantity
supplied by the home upstream firm, and uF to be the quantity supplied by the
foreign upstream firm. Let the inverse derived demand curve facing the u firns
be given by
p= P(UH+UF, O)
if no tariffs are imposed, and
p ‘p(uH +uF, T)
if they are.
For a given uH + uF, the inverse demand curves have the property that p
is decreasing in ~. That is, tariffs naturally reduce the derived demand for the
aAs usual the particular policies chosen will be sensitive to the timing of the game as well
as the competitive form and the strategy spaces chosen for all of the players. This example is
meant to be suggestive of the types of policies likely to be employed in pursuing a results-oriented
policy, rather than a fully general prescription of optimal Policy implementation.
‘In our setting, this derived demand curve will simply be the marginal revenue curve associ-
ated with the demand for autos.
10upstream good.
The profits of the d firm associated with country z = {H, F} when tariffs are
not imposed may then be written as
while when tariffs are imposed, profits are given by
~~i(uH,u~)= (~(uH + UF, ~)—c)Ui
We assume that profit functions are concave. Note that n; (uH,uF) lies above
nTi (UH, uF), as depicted in Figure 1. Finally, holding uF bed, the ufi which
m~imizes n~ (uH,uF) is greater than that which maximizes 7TTH(UH, UF); that
is, the best response function for H firms with a tariff lies below that without a
tariff. Likewise for F firms.
3. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we derive the best response functions for both the H and F firms in
the auto parts market. We then characterize the Na-shequilibria of the subgame,
11given the threat strategy chosen by the US (H) government.
3.1. Home Best Response Function
Given the output choice of the Japanese auto parts firm, the profit function of
the US firm is depicted in Figures Ia-lc. The curve denoted TO denotes home’s
profits if the threat is not carried out; whereas, the curve m7 denotes the profits
from different quantity choices, uH when the threatened tariffs are enacted. The
vertical line at uH = fiuF denotes the threshold level of home outputs required
for the satisfaction of the market share target. Thus, the bold portions of the two
profit functions define the composite profit function facing the H firm.
Let B~(uF) denote the optimal output choice of the H firm, given the output
choice uF by the F firm in the event no tariffs are imposed. Similarly, let BTH(uF)
be analogously defined in the event tariffs are imposed. Finally, let ~H(UF) denote
the overall best response function of the H firm.l” There are two cases:
(z) If B#(uF) 2 &UF, then BH(UF) = Bfl(uF). This case is depicted in
Figure la.
( (ii) If ~~(u~) < fiuF, then there aretwo possibilities. men, n~ fiuF, uF)
ll)Throughout the analYsis, we will assume that when a firm is indifferent to two strategies,
it chooses the strategy which results in the market share target being adhered to.
12(weakly) exceeds n~H (B7H(U ) ) F ,uF ,itisoptimal to adhere to the market sh~e





then BH(uF) = BTH(~F). This case is depicted in Figure lc.
Let u;(7) implicitly define the u. which solvesll
‘: &“FIuF) ‘nTH(BTH(uF)uF) (
(3.1)
Then if UF > u; (T),flH(uF) = BTH(UF), and otherwise ~H(uF) = &.F as
depicted in Figure 2.
Home’s best response function thus consists of determining for which outputs
uF home’s best response is given by Figures la- lC respectively. The best response
function for the H firm is as shown in Figure 2. The ray aa’ and the area lying to
11we are ~~uming that the solution is unique. In the linear demand case, this holds since
dn~ ~ dxrH ~ ~
du~ du~
H” hence the solution (if one H lies above z T , under case ii. Moreover, at B: (UF) = *UF, To
exists) is unique. We will assume analogous conditions hold for the F firm.
13the northwest of it represent the locus of output pairs (UF,u~) which satisfy the
market share target. For uF ~ uj in Figure 2, case (z) applies so that the best
response function is given by line segment AB. For u; ~ uF case (ii) applies. For
uF less than u>, the best response is given by line segment BC, and for u~ above
u;, the best response is given by line segment DE,
3.2. Foreign Best Response Function
It remains to construct the Japanese auto parts producer’s best response function.
Since the market share constraint represents a minimum market share for the US
firm, the Japanese firm’s problem is not symmetric with the US firm’s problem.
Figures 3a-3c reflect three cases for the foreign firm’s optimization problem.
All curves are identical to those of the home firm described in Figures la-lc;
however, the market share constraint, uF = ~uH now binds in the opposite
direction. That is, if the foreign firm’s output lies to the left of ~uH, then
the market share constraint is satisfied; whereas outputs to the right violate the
constraint. As in Figures la-lc, the curve denoted no denotes F firm’s profits
if the threat is not carried out; whereas, the curve nr denotes the profits from
different quantity choices, UF, when the threatened tariffs are enacted.
14Let B{(uH) denote the optimal output choice of the F firm, given the output
choice UH by the H fim in the event no tariffs are imposed. Similmly, let BTF (UH)
be analogously defined in the event tarfls are imposed. Finally, let ~F(uH) denote
the overall best response function of the F firm. There are two cases:
(z) If Bf(uH) < ~UH, then ~F (UH) = B~(uH). This case is depicted in
Figure 3a.
(ii) If B~(uH) >
(
&uH, then there aretwo possibilities. When, z; ~uH, uH)
(weakly) exceeds T7F (BTF(U~), uH) , it is optimal to adhere to the market shine
target; hence &F(~H) = ~uH, This case is depicted in Figure 3b.
Alternatively, if
( ~fGUHUH) <TTF(BTF(UH)JUH)
then it is optimal for F to choose ~F (uH) = BTF(u~). This case is depicted in
Figure 3c.
Let ufi(~) implicitly define the uH which solves
r:(GUHUH) ‘~TF(BrF(uH)JuH) (3.2)
15then ifu~ < ufi(~),~~(u~) = B~F(u~)) and otherwise ~~(u~) = ~u~ as
depicted in Figure 4.
Foreign best response function thus consists of determining for which outputs
uH its best response is given by Figures 3a-3c respectively. The best response
function for the F firm is as shown in Figure 4. The ray aa’ and the area lying to
the northwest of it represent the locus of output pairs (uF, uH) which satisfy the
market share target,
response function is
For uH greater than
For uH > u~ in Figure 4, case (z) applies so that the best
given by line segment AB. For uH ~ u~ case (ii) applies.
U;, the best response is given by line segment BC, and for
uH below U;, the best response is given by line segment DE.
3.3. Nash Equilibria
Figure 5 depicts the combination of the H and F best response functions.12Notice
that there is a continuum
represents the joint profit
of Nash equilibria along line segment EF. Point E
maximizing equilibrium choice of outputs from EF.
12Figure 5 depicts the case in which the market share target is binding and the threat is
sficiently severe to rule out equilibria in which the market share target is not met. The case in
which the market share target is binding but the threats are not severe is depicted in Figure 7,
discussed below, For the c=e in which the market share target is not binding, the introduction
of the threat does not tiect the equilibrium.
16Thus, in the presence of side payments, it seems reasonable to choose point E.
In equilibrium, the threat by the H government is never carried out and the
market share requirements are “voluntarily” satisfied by both fires. Comparing
point E to point G, the Cournot solution in the absence of market shine restric-
tions, shows that the total sales of auto parts fall. In addition, the H firms
increase its profits as a result of the VIE since both price and H’s output rise.
In contrast, the F fire’s profits decline as can be seen by drawing the relevant
isoprofit contour.
The intuition for the nature of the equilibria is as follows: On the one hand,
firms face a discrete reduction in profits by violating the market shine target
causing them to remain exactly on the market share line over some interval; thus
permitting a continuum of equilibria to arise. On the other hand, adhering to the
market share target can become too onerous, in which case firms will ignore the
market share target and accept the imposition of the threatened action.
To see these two forces concretely, consider the situation facing the H firm.
In the absence of the market share constraint, it will always be optimal for the
H firm to reduce its output when faced with output increasw by the F firm.
However, the threatened tariffs induce the H firm to choose the opposite action;
17that is, H must increase output in the face of F firm increases in order to ensure
adherence to the target. Eventually, the benefits of adherence are more than offset
by its costs, at which point the H fim switches to its standard best-response in
the presence of tariffs.
4. When Threats Fail
One may wonder about the limits to the effectiveness of the above policies. In
particular, under what conditions are such policies likely to work in a way con-
sistent with adherence to the market shine target? In this section, we identify
two potentially relevant circumstance under which the use of threats can fail.
First, the execution of the threatened action may actually be desirable for one of
the parties; we will refer to these as one-sided threats. Naturally, this will create
incentives for one of the parties to ensure that the market share target is not met.
Second, the threats may not be sufficiently severe to ensure that the market share
target is met, and hence, in equilibrium, the threat will be carried out. These are
termed weak threats.
184.1. One-sided Threats
One-sided threats are likely to be the case when Japanese and US downstream
goods are close substitutes and US upstream firms stand to gain from downstream
output expansion when tariffs are imposed. For example, suppose that all down-
stream firms have a strong home bias in the purchase of inputs. Then, if the
introduction of tariffs leads to significant market share gains on the part of down-
stream US firms, US input suppliers wodd have positive incentives to see that
upstream market share target (in Japan) was not met.
Thus, we ~sume that the US auto pints firm also competes in selling to US
auto manufacturers. When tariffs are in effect, demand in the segmented US auto
market expands and the equilibrium profits earned by the US parts manufacturer
increase by an amount at least k > 0, where k is large enough to compensate
for any reduction in profits due to the diminution of demand from Japanese auto
manufacturers. Now, if the H government decides to threaten to place a punitive
tariff on the F auto firm, then the tariff will have the effect of decreasing the
profits of the F auto parts firm and increasing the profits of the H firm. This
dramatically changes the incentives for the H auto parts firm to conform to the
market share target; specifically, the H firm will have positive intentives to ensure
that the target is not met.
19The above assumptions result in the profit function in the event a tariff is
imposed lying above the non-tariff profit function for the H firm. Again, there
are two cases to consider:
(2) If BT~(uF) < fiuF, then ~~(uF) = ~~~(uF). This case iSdepicted in
Fi~e 6a.
(ii) If ~~~(uF) z fi~F, then there are two possibilities. If mTH (AuF, UF)
(( )
(wea~y) exceeds 7rfl B; uF), uF , it is optimal to ‘just miss” the market share
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then it is optimal for H to choose BH(u~) = B; (uF). This cme is depicted in
Figure 6c.




20then ifu~ <u~(7),~~(u~) =B~(uF), andotherwise~~(u~) = fiu~-cas
depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7 illustrates the best response functions of each of the firms, Notice
that the foreign best response function is identical to that constructed previously.
Home’s best respome function thus consists of determining for which outputs UF
home’s best response is given by Figures 6a-6c respectively. For uF ~ u~ in Figure
7, case (i) applies so that the best response function is given by line segment DE.
For uF < u~ case (ii) applies, and for uF greater than u;, the best response is
given by line segment CD, and for uF less than u~, the best response is given by
line segment AB.
Combining the H and F best response functions reveals an equilibrium point
(given by Z) where the market share target is not met and tariffs are imposed.”
The intuition for the construction of the H best response function is that once
the F firm chooses a quantity exceeding u~, it pays for the H firm to choose
a quantity which fails to satisfy the market share target to take advantage of
13A ~autionarY note: It is possible that there will be no pure strategy equilibrium. For exam-
ple, a severe threat (i.e. an arbitrarily large tariff) will ensure that the F firm always adheres
to the market share target; hence, there will be no pure strategy equilibrium. Alternatively, if
the jump from adhering to the market share target to the best response function in the event of
a tariff occurs for a sufficiently small value of uH, then there will be no intersection at a point
like Z.
21increased profits from the higher demand for
Only when the F output is sticiently small
parts by H auto manufacturers.
will it benefit the home fim to
produce in such a way that the market share target is met.
In contrast to circumstance in which both firms are hurt by the imposition of
a tariff (in which case the market share target was exactly met); here, there are
no regions in which the H and F firms find it mutually desirable to see that the
market share target is satisfied. There are no pure strategy equilibria exactly on
the market share line, since, in this case, H fires will always wish to “just miss”
the target. Obviously, there me no pure strategy equilibria where the market
share target is more than met, since this would involve an intersection of the no-
tariff best response functions in the non-binding region. By construction, this is
impossible. This leaves only cases in which tariffs will be imposed; hence, the only
possible pure strategy equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the best response
functions in the presence of a tariff.
This result is similar to Reitzes and Grawe [15], who model the effects of the
imposition of a market share quota on imports. In a Cournot market in which
a market share quota is imposed at free trade levels, home firms choose to “hide
behind the quota” by sometimes producing less than the free trade level of output.
If foreign firms continue to produce at free trade levels, they are faced with the
22additional costs of violating the quota. Thus, the market share quota acts as a
one-sided threat.
4.2. Weak Threats
Suppose now that threats made by the H government have little effect on the
derived demand (and hence the profits) of the auto parts firms. The downward
shift of the best response functions due to the imposition of the tariffs is small.
This results in a case like that depicted in Figure 8.
In Figure 8 the two best response functions have no intersection along the
market share target ray, aa’, instead, they intersect at point Z, the usual Nash
equilibrium given the imposition of the tariff. Since there is little movement in
the best response functions, there will be little difference between Z and the equi-
librium in the absence of tariffs. Notice that this results in both firms producing
smaller quantities than in the unconstrained case. Of interest is the fact that a
small threat does not manage to achieve the desired market share outcome.
235. Direct Implementation
Suppose now that the H government attempts to implement the VIE directly
through production taxes/subsidies rather than through threats. As Krishna,
Roy and Thursby [13] show, the timing of the movw in this game is crucial;
however, we shall assume that the government moves fist, followed by the firms.
Provided that the H government was perfectly informed about all aspects of costs
and demand, implementation involves choosing trees/subsidies in such a way that
the best response functions shift to a point where they exactly intersect along the
aa’ line. This analysis closely parallels Greaney[9].
In Figure 9, we see that by introducing a production subsidy for the H firm,
the H government shifts out the firm’s best response function (BR~) to BR~
where it intersects both with the F firm’s best response function (BRF) as well
as with the market share constraint (aa’). Alternatively, by introducing a tax
on the F fire, we can likewise attain the market share constraint. Furthermore,
combinations of the two policies make all points on EF attainable. Notice that
EF in Figure 9 is identical to EF in Figure 5.
It seems unreasonable to suppose that the US would be able to tax the
.
24Japanese firms directly; thus, only point F in Figure 9 wotid in practice be
attainable through direct intervention. We earlier rogued that point F resulted
in lower industry profits than point E; hence, direct intervention results in lower
industry profits as well as requiring considerable information for the home govern-
ment to implement. For these reasons, we argue that the H government is better
off relying on threats rather than direct intervention to implement the VIE.
5.1. Combining Threats with Direct Intervention
Suppose now that we allow the H government to offer both direct incentives
w well as threats w a means of achieving the market share target in the most
favorable manner,
In Figure 10, point Z corresponds to the
home auto parts firm consistent with meeting
highest attainable profits by the
the market share target.14 While
(due to symmetry) M corresponds to the monopoly output, which maximizes
industry profits. It seems natural to ask whether M or Z we implementable
as a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, we cannot implement either point using threats
141n figure 10 we have drawn Z such that it lies above M; however, in general Z may lie
above or below M, Regardless, the Z may be implemented by a combination of direct policies
and threats.
25or direct intervention (not involving t=es/subsidies on F firms) alone; however,
when threats and direct intervention are combined, both, M and Z are attainable.
If the H government places a quantity tax on the home firm, then its best
response function is shifted back to BR’~. Thus, if a large enough threat is made,
by our usual arguments along the lines of Figure 5, line segment FZ represents
the locus of Nash equilibrium outputs.
home best response function such that
Similarly, choosing a tax which shifts the
it intersects with point M likewise yields
FA4 as the 10CWof Nash equilibrium outputs. Thus, a combination of threats
and direct actions can be more effective than either policy alone.
The particulars of the direct intervention portion of this policy are surprising.
In the case of direct intervention alone, we required a subsidy on the home firm;
however, when both types of policies are wed in combination, a tux on the home
firm is required.15
6. N x M Firm Case
In this section, we extend the model to allow for N home firms and M foreign
firms, all of whom are identical, to compete in a market subject to a market share
15This reversal of policies relative to standard results is similar to Spencer and Jones [16] in
examining vertical foreclose.
26target. To retain tractability, we restrict attention to the linear demand case.
Of particulm interest is the minimum threat required to implement the desired
market share target as the number of firms changes.
Since the details of the procedure for making this calculation me cumbersome
and unenlightening, we do not present them here.16 The basic idea is best under-
stood by considering the duopoly case. In this case, it is clear that the minimum
threat implementing the market shine target is one such that the home and foreign
best responses just “touch” at a point between EF in Figure 5. Notice that this
requires that both the home and foreign firms be indifferent between adhering to
the market share target and accepting the imposition of the tariffs. For the home
firm, this involves solving (3.1) to obtain u:(T) and , implicitly, u~(u~) along the
aa’ line. In Figure 2, this is given by point C. Likewise, the foreign firm solves
(3.2) to obtain ufi(T) and u~(u~) along the aa’ line; this is given by point C in
Figure 4. The minimum r, then, is such that the points C given in Figures 2 and
4 coincide. Analogously, in the N x M case, restricting attention to symmetric
equilibria enables us to follow an identical procedure.
While it is difficult to say anything in general about the properties of the
solutions to this system of equations, we can examine numerical results from
16DetailS areavailable from the authors Llpon request.
27some simple cases. The system of equations is given by (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3) in
Appendix B. We impose symmetric outputs on the home and foreign firms and
consider a linear inverse demand curve of the form:
to a 3 x 3 system. The results of numerical exercises
and 2.
P = 10 – Q. This reduces
are summarized in Tables 1
In the symmetric case, summarized in Table 1, increasing the market share
target requires higher minimum threats for implementation. As expected, lower
threats are needed as the number of firms increases for a given market share target.
As the market share target increases, output for foreign fires falls while output for
home firms rises. Industry output also rises. Moreover, industry output is larger
than in the absence of market share requirements (benchmark)-a pr~competitive
result! Finally, relative to the benchmark,
foreign firm profits always decrease.
home fim profits always increase and
In the asymmetric case, summarized in Table 2, holding fixed the total num-
ber of firms, we see that smaller threats are needed as the percentage of home
firms increases. Also, industry output is increasing in the percentage of home
firms. Perhaps more surprising is that industry output relative to the benchmark
depends upon the composition of firms. Table 2 shows that in the event that
foreign firms constitute the majority, industry output is less than the benchmuk-
28an anti-competitive outcome. In the opposite case, industry output exceeds the
benchmark-a pr~competitive result. This suggests that having a large propor-
tion of foreign firns (domestic firms) would make the market share requirement,
when implemented with the minimal tariff, anti-competitive (pro-competitive). In
contrast to the symmetric case, it is possible for both home and foreign firms to
gain and to lose relative to the benchmark. In Table 2, with a large proportion of
home firms (i.e. N=4 or N=5, M=l, a = .88), both lose. With a large proportion
of foreign firms (i.e. N=l, M=15, a = .1), both gain.17
7. Conclusion
We have shown that a credible threat in a linked market can be an informationally
efficient way of implementing a VIE. Moreover, the resultant equilibrium can
increase industry profits and, perhaps more importantly, the profits of all firms
when the proportion of foreign firms is large. On the other hand, when the
proportion of foreign firms is not too large, industry output increases leading to
pro-competitive results from the imposition of market share requirements. In
some cases this can even reduce the profits of both firms.
If the threats tiect the H and F firms differently, or if they are not very severe,
17This case is not given in Table 2.
29then the resulting equilibria can change dramatically. In the former case, the H
firm has incentives to slightly underproduce such that the market share target is
“just” missed. In the latter case, the equilibrium involves both firms accepting
the tarfls and playing the Nash equilibrium associated with the derived demand
curves in the presence of the tariff. Since the costs of absorbing the tariff are
not too large, firms are less willing to adjust their behavior to conform with the
market sh~e target. In the case of direct intervention, we find that the use of
threat rather than direct intervention is preferred by the country whose imports
the WE is intended to expand. Moreover, a combination of threats and direct
intervention appears to be superior to either policy alone.
We would not advocate the use of threats in related markets w a means of
implementing all market share targets. The paper tries to delineate the cir-
cumstantes likely to be qualitatively important to the outcome of such policies.
Specifically, the relative size of home and foreign representation in the market,
the restrictiveness of the market share requirements, the impact of the threat
on derived demand, and the extent of home bias in downstream markets are all
import ant factors. Nonetheless, successful implementation usually results in US
firm profits rising even when industry output rises.la That is, threats can be
IsThese conditions only hold in cases in which the proportion of US firms is not too small.
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34A. Price Competition
An obvious criticism to the above analysis is that perhaps the efficacy of the threat
by the H government is solely an artifact of the strategy space of the firms. That
is, with price competition, perhaps mere threats are not enough to implement the
market share target. As we shall see, this turns out not to be the case.
Suppose now that the fires are differentiated product Bertrand competitors
and each faces demand curve
Ui = Ui (pi,~j;T)
where z,j = {H, F} and z # j. The demand curve is assumed to have the usual
properties of differentiated Bertrand competition, namely ~ <0, ~ >0. The
analogue to our earlier resumption of identical fires in the Cournot case is the
assumption of symmetric demand curves. As usual, we assume that u is decreasing
in r.
Definition A. 1. Two demand curves Ui,Uj are symmetric it for a~~ P, P’ Ui (P, P’, T) =
Uj (p’, p,T) .




uH (pH,pF, T) + uF (pF,pH, T)
It is readily apparent that, given our assumptions, the locus of points, (pi,pj)
satisfying the above inequality is everywhere upward sloping. In the case where
ui is linear in its arguments, the region satisfying the above inequality is given by
a half-plane lying to the northwest of the line aa in Figure 11.
Notice that if a high price, pi, is chosen then the best response to the uncon-
strained Bertrand game, p~, isoptimal since the market shine target is satisfied.
Thus, line segment AB represents H’s best response function over this region. For
all prices less than p;, the unconstrained Bertrand best-response by the H firm
does not satisfy the market share constraint. Thus, the H firm is faced with the
choice between accepting the imposition of the tariff and best-responding to the
tariff induced demand function, or choosing a price such that the market share
constraint is satisfied. Since the tariff induced demand curve reduces profits dis-
continuously in
constraint only
the neighborhood of p;; whereas adherence to the market share
results in infinitesimal profit reductions, it is clear that in thisneighborhood, adhering to the constraint is a best response. Provided the tariffs
are sficiently large, this will be the case for all prices in the interval pF l [0,p;] .
Thus, H’s best response function in this region is given by the line segment Aa.
Figure 12 depicts the F firm’s best-response function. In constructing this
function for the F firm, similar economic forces color the firm’s optimal pricing
decision. As a result, in the intervalpH E [0,p;], F chooses its standard Bertrand
best-response, which constitute line segment AB. For prices in the interval pH G
(pi, FI’9) the~firm choos~ Pric=w~ch justsatisfy themarket share target; this
is represented by the interval Ba’.
Combining the best response functions, Figure 13 shows a continuum of equi-
libria given by line segment EF.
Qualitatively, these results are quite similar to those obtained in the case of
quantity competition suggesting that the efficacy of credible threats in enforcing
VIES is, to some extent, robust to the specification of the firms’ strategy space.
lg~ represents the maximum price for which adhering to the market share requirement yields
positive demand for the good.
37B. The N x M Case
Suppose the there are N home firms and M foreign firms competing Cournot
style in a market subject to a market share
government can make a “threat” which, if
target. Suppose also that the home
implemented, shifts back the linear
demand curve which these firms face by an amount t.
We consider the simple case where inverse demand is given by
P=A– Q
Home fires simultaneously choose quantiti= xi, i = 1, ...N. Likewise, foreign fires
choose quantities yj, j = 1, ...M of outputs to supply the market.
The market share target requires that the overall market share for home firms
must be aYo of the market. Thus, for the market share target to be met requires:
Our task is to find the minimum amount t such that adherence to the market
share target is a Nash equilibrium for the firms.
Given the actions of all other fires) if the kth home firm adheres to the market
38share target, then k’s choice satisfies
or equivalently
‘k=+[a(2zi+Ey’) -2xil
If k chooses to violate the market share target, then the quantity strategy xk
chosen is simply the conventional Cournot best response
Similarly, the lth foreign firm’s choice yl must satisfy
or equivalently
39And violating the market share constraint yields
Thus, it is natural to compare indirect profits of employing these two strategies
to see the locus at which k (1) is indifferent.
Define nc (z, y) as the profits msociated with conforming to the market share
target given the quantity vector x.k = ~~~kXz,y = ~J~l yj. Then
Let nD(z, y) be the profits from violating the market share target given the







thus, we seek the locus, x, y such that mC(Z_~,y) = ~D(~_k, y)
T= ((




A–t–(z_~+y) — — A–t– X_~+y+
2 2 )
(B.1)
40Similarly, for the foreign firms, we define quantity vectors x = ELI xi, y-l =
~j~l yj. Th~





TD(z, y_l)= A–t– Z+y–/+
2 2 )
are 1’s profits when it deviates. Finding the locus of indifference yields








Thus, to find the N + M + 1 utio~ for Xi, Yj, and ~ requir= that we solve
the following system of simultaneous equations:
For k= 1...N :
((




A–t–(z-k+y) — — A–t– x_k+y+
2 2 )
41For 1= 1...A4











Changing Market Shares with Complete Symmetry
N=M=l t x Y output Benchmark ~ ~
a = .51 .0003 3.4 3.27 6.67 6.67 1.02 .98
a=.6 .0338 4.0 2.68 6.69 6.67 1.20 .80
~=.7 .1411 4.7 2.03 6.76 6.67 1.38 ,59
a=.8 .3448 5.5 1.38 6.90 6.67 1.54 .39
Q!=.g .7143 6.4 0.71 7.14 6.67 1.65 .18
N=M=4 t x Y output Benchmark ? q
a =.51 .0001 1.1 1.09 8.89 8.89 1.02 .98
~=.6 .0112 1.3 0.89 8.90 8.89 1.19 .79
Q=.7 .0466 1.6 0.67 8.93 8.89 1.35 .58
Q=m8 .1124 1.8 0.45 8.99 8.89 1.47 .37
~=. g .2273 2.0 0.23 9.09 8.89 1.51 .17
N=M=8 t x Y output Benchmark : ~
~ = .51 .0001 0.6 0.58 9.41 9.41 1.02 .98
a=.6 .0059 0.7 0.47 9.42 9.41 1.18 .79
~=.7 .0246 0.8 0.35 9.44 9.41 1.34 ,57
a=.8 .0592 0.9 0.24 9.47 9.41 1.45 .36
~=. g .1191 1.1 0.12 9.52 9.41 1.49 .17
t = Minimum tariff required to implement market share target
X = Per firm output for home country
Y = Per firm output for foreign country
Output = Industry output under market share requirements
Ben~chmark = Industry output in the absence of market share require-
ments
~ = ~tio of home firm profits under market share requirements
ben~~mark





o! = .75 t x Y output Benchmark q ~
N=2, M=2 .1358 3.0 1.01 8.11 8.00 1.44 .48
N=3, M=2 .0454 2.1 1.06 8.46 8.33 1.17 .59
N=4, M=2 .0137 1.6 1,08 8.66 8.57 1.07 .71
N=5)M=2 .0025 1.3 1.10 8.79 8.75 1.02 .85
N=l, M=2 .4786 5.5 .91 7.29 7.50 2.37 .40
N=l, M=3 .6250 5.6 .63 7.50 8.00 3.52 .39
N=l, M=4 .7235 5.7 .48 7.63 8.33 4.88 .41
N=l, M=5 .7956 5.8 .39 7.71 8.57 6.49 .43
a = .88 t x Y output Benchmark ~ ~
N=2, M=1 .2001 3.5 .96 7.97 7.50 1.14 .31
N=3, M=1 .0796 2.5 1.00 8.35 8.00 1.01 .41
N=4, M=1 .0322 1.9 1.03 8.57 8.33 .97 .53
N=5, M=1 .0117 1.5 1.05 8.72 8.57 .96 .66
N=l, M=2 .8898 6.5 .44 7.41 7.50 2.70 .18
N=l, M=3 1.029 6.6 .30 7.55 8.00 4.07 .18
N=l, M=4 1.118 6.7 .23 7,64 8.33 5.71 .19
N=l, M=5 1.181 6.8 .18 7.70 8.57 7.64 .21
t = Minimum tariff required to implement market share target
X = Per firm output for home country
Y = Per firm output for foreign country
Output = Industry output under market share requirements
Benchmark = Industry output in the absence of market share require-
ments
~ = Ratio of home firm profits under market share requirements
ben~~mark
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